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The Propaganda Machine Behind the Controversy Over Climate 
Science: Can You Spot the Lie in This Title? 
 
Abstract 
 
The essay examines various communication strategies for advocating 
acceptance of climate science in the face of psychological and ideological 
impediments. It surveys some key literature, offers case studies of Lego, Shell, 
Greenpeace, Edelman, and public relations, and culminates with a hortatory 
logic based on the recent Papal encyclical. The focus is on issues pertaining to 
the United States but with examples and ideas from elsewhere. 
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Introduction 
This is an unusual essay for American Behavioral Scientist, in that it adopts 
a clear stance on a question of political, but not scientific, disagreement. It 
also draws on a wide variety of approaches, acknowledging the importance 
of ideas from the humanities, the sciences, and the social sciences as well 
as advocacy and activism to make the following point: The reality of the 
ecological crisis is such that the presentation of scientific fact alone is 
insufficient to persuade policy makers and the population alike that change 
is needed. In addition to the clear communication of knowledge, a variety of 
approaches is necessary that draws on the theories, practices, and skills 
not only of climate science but of ideological analysis, psychology, and 
power structure analysis from a critical political-economic perspective. 
 Our principal site is the United States of America, because it has been, 
and continues to be, responsible for so much planetary risk. Seventy-five 
percent of the U.S. public believes the atmosphere is warming to dangerous 
levels; half of them believe that humans have caused this destructive trend; 
and most demand political action to protect the environment. Latin@s and 
Blacks are more likely than White Americans to identify humans as the 
primary cause of global warming—a telling difference, as we will see, when 
we consider the racial composition of environmental organizations in the 
following section (Krogstad, 2015). We also know that there is political 
polarization over the science, with Republicans the least prepared to 
acknowledge the truth (Guber, 2013). A more important question to pose 
 is, given how clear the science is on this subject, why do 25% of Americans 
(the majority of them White) continue to doubt the very idea of climate 
change? The answer cannot be simply attributed to the media and other 
real-life thinking machines, but to a range of communication channels and 
strategies, conscious propaganda efforts of so-called contrarians and 
denialists to distort facts, religious superstition coupled with suspicion of 
secular expertise (though here, Pope Francis offers a powerful counter, as 
we will discuss below), and serious lack of political tenacity to smash the 
power structure ruled by fossil fuel industrialists. 
Ideology and Communication Strategies 
Let us say you want to advocate for a greener school or workplace. You have 
an initial list of ecologically sound goals: recycling, green cleaning 
chemicals, water filtration to reduce plastic bottle use, organic waste 
composting, solar-powered rechargers, and so on. Once these institutional 
changes are in place, you will have created the conditions for part-time 
environmentalism: Everyone in the institution will have the opportunity to 
act in environmentally conscious ways. 
  But being a part-time environmentalist is not a gateway to full-time 
involvement. Getting “involved” is time-consuming and difficult to fit into 
what sociologists call habits of thought. And green habits of thought are 
prerequisites for thorough and effective full-time environmentalism through 
everyday social routines. 
  To persuade people to make environmentalism more than a part-time 
activity, you could use a green media campaign. The media (as broadly 
defined) play a pivotal role in spreading knowledge of the scientific, social, 
and political variables on which environmental literacy depends (Boykoff & 
Yulsman, 2013).1 But it is never a simple matter of persuasion by reason. 
Most scholars would agree that media campaigns must account for 
preexisting biases and ideologies. Such beliefs help explain how and when 
green persuasion works—or does not. 
  One common bias associates environmentalism with affluent, or 
economically comfortable sectors of the population. The idea is that working 
stiffs just want to survive and are too busy making a living to invest in a 
movement that appears to run counter to the model of economic growth on 
which they rely. But that assumption is old-fashioned. As environmentalism 
has developed, it has shown increasing concern for just those workers 
whose livelihoods depend on the extractive and manufacturing sectors. And 
with that change has come a diffusion of environmental understanding 
across class boundaries (Pampel & Hunter, 2012). 
We are also peddled myths about “American Exceptionalism,” which 
argue that the country is different from everybody else. The grounds for 
this claim are that the United States is an immigrant nation (as if it were 
the only one) and a beacon for the rest of the world. In fact, U.S. 
citizens’ environmental behavior and attitudes are remarkably 
consonant with the rest of the world’s (Hadler & Haller, 2013). One 
exception is argu- ably the incompetence of our mainstream media, 
because they persist, by and large, in allowing equal time to different 
perspectives along a right–left continuum, however fraudulent some of 
the claims they report may be (Hart & Feldman, 2014). We know, for 
instance, that Fox News and the Wall Street Journal generally misinform 
the public about climate science, and much entertainment programming 
distorts the context, his- tory, and social impact of global warming—
when such themes are presented at all  (T. Miller & Pollak, 2012). 
Commercialization and disinvestment in investigative reporting have 
not only diminished public trust in journalism but have disabled 
informational media from responding in a robust and consistent manner 
to widespread distortion and confusion (Boykoff & Yulsman, 2013). 
Activist communication strategies also play a role in the media 
distortions. Studies have shown that many people experience activists 
as militant and eccentric, which foregrounds their otherness in such 
caricatures as tree-hugging hippies, dangerous ecoterrorists, 
antigrowth evangelists, economic ignoramuses, middle-class 
layabouts, vapid vegans, or romantic dreamers. While that otherness 
may be a core part of environmentalists’ identities (behaving differently 
in public, grabbing attention, securing column inches), it severely limits 
their ability to communicate effectively across a range of 
constituencies, leaving them stuck in a self-fulfilling vanguardist politics 
(Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013). Such 
vanguardism may preach to the choir, gain press coverage, and 
buttress fundraising potential among true believers. But it does not 
persuade ordinary people, and in the process fails to live up to its 
grassroots mythology (an exception might be the example from 
Greenpeace we discuss below). 
Major environmental organizations also suffer from a crippling 
paradox in their racial composition. Whereas the majority of people 
involved in some form of activist environmentalism are White, the 
majority of people responding favorably to climate science and 
proenvironmental messages are Latin@ and Black. This is a disturbing 
and durable trend: The proportion of non-Whites involved in agencies 
that work on the environment (NGOs, government, and grant-giving 
organizations) has held steady at between 12% and 16% for decades 
(Taylor, 2014). 
  
Perhaps the reason minority opinion differs when it comes to 
acceptance of climate science and promotion of green political action 
is that non-White populations are dis- proportionately affected by 
environmental harms, giving rise to the terms “environmen- tal racism” 
and “environmental justice” (Mohai, Pellow, & Roberts, 2009). For 
instance, the Federal Government’s Office of Minority Health, which is 
part of the Department of Health and Human Services, says Native 
Americans suffer from asthma at an 80% higher rate than Whites. 
African Americans are 20% likelier to visit hospitals due to asthma than 
White folks and Latinos are 30% likelier (Office of Minority Health, 2014). 
While there are numerous causes of asthma, many correlate with 
environmental hazards concentrated in minority communities. In any 
case, these are appalling statistics. 
We know that people who do not regard themselves as directly 
affected tend to embrace environmental values when stimulated to 
think beyond their own lives and engage the cross-generational impact 
of climate change in order to consider the lives of those yet to be 
(Zavall, Markowitz, & Weber, 2015). This should be a hallmark of 
conservatism. Two centuries ago, one of the ideology’s founders and 
patron saints, Edmund Burke, famously called for “a partnership not 
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born” to sustain “the great 
primeval contract of eternal society” (Burke, 1909-1914). Such 
intergenerational care is a centerpiece of sustainability. Why does this 
conserva- tive attitude not seep into right-wing ideologies when 
confronted with evidence of climate change? 
 
Psychology  and  Communication Strategies 
Recent social and neuropsychological studies suggest that the 
effectiveness of the message depends to a significant extent on how 
well it communicates across liberal and conservative partisan lines. 
This might seem like another “duh” moment in the annals of science, 
like testing whether or not people feel happier when it is sunny rather 
than cloudy. After all, on the topic of environmental risk, the 
conventional wisdom (especially in the United States and somewhat 
in the United Kingdom) is that climate change is a liberal concern, 
while conservatives attack the notion as hokum. But along with the 
opinion research outlined above, these psychological studies show that 
concerns over the environment do not always hue strictly to political 
ideology. 
Researchers have investigated the impact of “environmental 
discourse” in newspaper editorials and public-service announcements 
and found that the media primarily frame environmental risk through 
 moral arguments about social harm and care. These resonate most 
effectively with liberals. When proenvironmental discourse shifts into 
the “moral domain” of purity and disgust, its messages resonate better 
with conservatives. The researchers recommend that reframing 
proenvironmental messages using both harm/care and purity/disgust 
“can reduce the gap between liberals and conservatives in 
environmental concerns” (Feinberg & Willer, 2013, p. 56). 
Another recent study—a collaboration between political scientists 
and neuroscientists in the United States and Europe—raises related 
questions by examining the brain functions of liberals and conservatives 
exposed to risk taking. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
they found that both groups are willing risk takers, but liberals and 
conservatives differ dramatically in their brain activity when doing so. 
Conservatives activate the right amygdala, which is attuned to external 
threats and potential rewards. Liberals, by contrast, have greater 
activity in the area associated with social and self- awareness. The 
researchers observe that “acting as a partisan in a partisan environment 
may alter the brain, above and beyond the effect of heredity” (Schreiber 
et al., 2013). The first of these studies tells us that conservatives react 
to repellent imagery of environmental disaster in proenvironmental 
ways because it elicits disgust or poses threats to bodily purity—
contaminated water, toxic spills, smog-enveloped cities, and so on. The 
researchers suggest that green persuasion could enlist this moral 
frame together with the care/harm frame, for example, by using 
imagery with a liberal emphasis on the aesthetic and moral values 
humans derive from nature in combination with images that 
conservatives might find distasteful, such as scary pictures of habitat 
destruction and oil-slimed waterways. Their proposal is consonant with 
communication strategies offered by cognitive linguistic research on 
environmental frames, ideology, and political partisanship (Lakoff, 
2010). 
The neuropolitical “Red Brain, Blue Brain” study argues that political 
milieux structure how brains function, suggesting that conservatives 
and liberals who live in the echo chamber of their political beliefs—
including the media they use—engage with such risks as climate 
change in significantly different ways. This is intriguing research, and 
hints at new and interesting directions for green persuasion.2 These 
stud- ies suggest that any campaign to persuade large groups of people 
to think and act in a proenvironmental manner must take into account 
not only political ideologies and biases but also moral cues and neural 
processes. 
Finally, several other psychological factors play a role in information 
processing of environmental messages. Disagreements among climate 
experts appearing in the media tend to be perceived as evidence of the 
 underlying science’s weakness. While uncertainty is a research 
scientist’s stock-in-trade, it plays negatively for nonspecialist publics 
and undermines the legitimacy of fact-based research. This can lead to 
what psychologists call “ambiguity aversion,” an attitude that favors 
inaction while supporting business as usual (stick with the devil you 
know, in other words). This can make audiences vulnerable to claims 
supporting the status quo that are based entirely on wishful thinking, 
again diminishing the will to action on climate change (Lewandowsky, 
Oreskes, Risbey, & Newell, 2015). 
 
Political Economy and Power Structure Analysis of 
Communication Strategies 
We shall consider now communication strategies based in power 
structure analysis, a key tool in political-economic research. 
October 9, 2014 was a big day in ecoactivism: Lego announced that 
it would not renew a product placement deal with Shell, following 
concerted pressure from Greenpeace that included two ingenious 
videos attacking Lego’s collaboration with Shell. The first and most 
popular took music, words, images, and logos from one of the most 
successful films of the year, The Lego Movie (2014; Box Office Mojo, 
2015), to create a postmodern pastiche aimed at the heartstrings of all 
(Greenpeace, 2014a). The second, artier and less direct, was targeted 
at parents and sought to use the world’s two other principal languages, 
Spanish and Putonghua, spoken by young people (Greenpeace, 
2014b). The first text became a market leader for advertising agencies 
in what are known as “attack ads,” whose primary raison d’être is 
belittling others (Nudd, 2013, 2014). 
Corporate polluters engage in collaborations with companies like 
Lego as part of their quest to obtain what they call “a social license to 
operate,” which is among the many communication strategies 
employed by polluting companies to depict them- selves as civil society 
stakeholders, with the ultimate aim of eluding environmental regulation 
(Nelsen, 2006; Prno & Slocombe, 2012; Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). 
Forbes magazine called 2013 the year of such licenses for the 
extractive sector (International Energy Agency, 2012; Klein, 2012). 
Greenpeace hit a nerve in Legoland on July 1, 2014, just after the 
first video had emerged, Lego said: 
 
The Greenpeace campaign focuses on how Shell operates in a 
specific part of the world. We firmly believe that this matter must 
be handled between Shell and Greenpeace. We are saddened 
when the LEGO brand is used as a tool in any dispute between 
organisations. (Lego, July 2014) 
 
 A few months later, the company’s tune was significantly different: 
 
We continuously consider many different ways of how to deliver on 
our promise of bringing creative play to more children. We want to 
clarify that as things currently stand we will not renew the co-
promotion contract with Shell when the present contract ends. 
We do not want to be part of Greenpeace’s campaign and we 
will not comment any further on the campaign. We will continue to 
deliver creative and inspiring LEGO play experiences to children 
all over the world. (Lego, October 2014) 
 
Greenpeace true believers called it “one of the most high-profile 
victories in its his- tory” thanks to “guerrilla tactics” (Bermingham, 2014), 
where activism trumped business and ethics triumphed over size. But 
this story is really about how a power structure analysis can be 
employed in a populist activist communication strategy, even if the 
scale of the power structure behind the fossil fuel industry necessitates 
a much broader understanding of the political economy than the one 
presented by Greenpeace. 
If we want to secure our ecosystems’ future, then in addition to 
worrying about the ideology and psychology of the population and the 
pranks of activist cadres, we must do something about the hundreds of 
millions of dollars dedicated to antiscientific propaganda (Funk & 
Rainie, 2015). For no rational argument, no fact about atmospheric 
warming, and no majority opinion aligned with the scientific consensus 
possesses the inherent power to beat the weapons of misinformation 
wielded by rich and powerful fossil fuel industrialists and their 
supporters. 
When nonsense and charlatanry are tolerated as legitimate rivals 
alongside sense and scientific research, calls for action to protect the 
environment can be easily thwarted. And there is no greater 
misinformation weapon than uncertainty about the underlying science. 
Science deniers and contrarians now operate as “merchants of doubt” 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010) paid to help polluting industries fend off 
proenvironmental legislation, “dissipate pressure for progress” (D. 
Miller & Dinan, 2015, 
p. 99), attack and destroy the character of environmentalists, and 
undermine the legiti- macy of independent climate science, targeting in 
particular the consensus findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, “the world’s leading authority on climate issues” 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010, p. 2). 
These doubt merchants perfected the swindle selling lies to the public 
about tobacco in the 1960s. Consider the mendacity of this tobacco 
executive, who, in an internal memo from 1969, said: 
  
Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with 
the “body of fact” that exists in the mind of the general public. It is 
also the means of establishing a controversy. Within the business 
we recognize that a controversy exists. However, with the general 
public the consensus is that cigarettes are in some way harmful to 
the health. If we are successful in establishing a controversy at the 
public level, then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts 
about smoking and health. Doubt is also the limit of our “product.” 
(quoted in Readfearn, 2015b)3 
 
In a series of articles written for The Guardian, Graham Readfearn 
(2015a) detailed what he calls the “four main cogs that make up the 
machinery” of the doubt business: “conservative ‘free market’ think 
tanks, public relations groups, fossil fuel organizations and ideologically 
aligned media.” 
Sifting through internal documents from the fossil fuel industry, 
Readfearn identified groups of lobbyists, think tanks, and PR 
professionals that have conspired with the industry for decades on 
misinformation projects about climate change. Drawing on strategies 
from the tobacco industry campaign to silence the truth about the health 
effects of smoking—many of the same denialists from the tobacco 
campaigns moved on to the climate project—the aim was to infect 
“conventional wisdom among the public” with “uncertainties” (their 
word, not Readfearn’s). Other examples include a 1991 campaign 
funded by the coal utilities to “recruit scientists to [in their words] 
‘reposition global warming as theory (not fact)’.” 
Readfearn quotes the notorious 2000 memo that U.S. Republican 
consultant Frank Luntz directed to the energy industry: 
 
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are 
settled, their views about global warming will change accordingly. 
Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientific 
certainty a primary issue in the debate. 
 
Luntz should be remembered as the propagandist who managed 
successfully to have the phrase “global warming” replaced with “climate 
change” because, he said, it is “less frightening” (Lakoff, 2010; 
Readfearn, 2015b) and, we would add, more welcoming of dubious or 
ephemeral data that appear to contradict the trend toward global 
warming. One of the most useful tools for doing a power structure 
analysis of the doubt industry is available at DeSmog, which bills its 
mission as “clearing the PR pollution that clouds climate science.” 
DeSmog’s “Global Warming Disinformation Database” pro- vides 
 background on individuals from around the world who peddle 
contrarian piffle with fake science and other rubbish (DeSmog, n.d.). 
Dr. Willie Soon, one of the more notorious denialists on their list, made 
headlines in 2015 when investigators found that his bogus climate 
science denials, which he was promoting as independent research, 
was bought with $1.5 million in payments from fossil fuel companies 
(Readfearn,2015a). 
Subterfuge takes many forms in the PR business. One of the world’s 
biggest PR corporations, Edelman, announced in 2014 that they would 
no longer work for climate science deniers (Barrett, 2015; Goldenberg, 
2014), but a year later, word spread that it had advised the American 
Petroleum Institute through a subsidiary, Blue Advertising (Quinn & 
Young, 2015).4 Caught out in the American Petroleum Institute scandal, 
Edelman claimed to be misunderstood, sacrificed an executive, 
announced that it believed in climate change, and divested from Blue 
Advertising (Elliott, 2014; Gunther, 2014; Sudhaman, 2015). 
Edelman is a serial perpetrator of such fraud across many industries. 
In tobacco, it dedicated decades to combating medical science, 
encouraging smokers to continue their deluded indulgence (Corporate 
Watch, 2015). In pharmaceuticals, it hawked fraudulent research 
guaranteeing hair regrowth to gullible guys (Moynihan, Heath, & Henry, 
2002). In chemicals, it set up supposedly grassroots campaigns for 
Monsanto attacking critiques of genetically modified food (Beder, 
1998). In retail, it paid operatives masquerading as cross-country 
campers to blog favorably about Walmart car parks and store managers 
(Frazier, 2006). And in the extractive sector, its collaboration with Trans 
Canada sought to discredit anyone questioning the Energy East 
pipeline (Greenpeace, 2014c). Ironically, the PR industry is forced to 
resort to PR to cover up such misdeeds, promoting rarely enforced 
rules against such routine tricks in its so- called code of ethics (Burton 
& Rowell, 2003; Public Relations Society of America, 2015; Schäfer, 
2012; Schlichting, 2013). 
There is a long list of think tanks that target the scientific consensus; 
some worth mentioning in the United States are the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, The George 
C. Marshall Institute, the Heartland Institute, The Science and Public 
Policy Institute, and the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow; in 
Canada, The Fraser Institute; in the United Kingdom, the Global 
Warming Policy Foundation; in Australia, the Institute of Public Affairs, 
also a big backer of the tobacco industry (Institute of Public Affairs 
urges supporters to enjoy the tax advantages of crowdfunding “a 
climate book with chapters written by a familiar line-up of climate 
science denialists—one of which was Dr Soon” (Readfearn, 2015a). 
Many of the fossil fuel industrialists backing the mer- chants of doubt 
 (ExxonMobil and Koch Industries the biggest among them) also fun- nel 
money through organizations like the Donors Trust, which exists to 
obscure the source of the dirty money (D. Miller & Dinan, 2015, p. 104). 
Toward the end of the 20th century, a new strategy emerged that 
took a different form than contrarian propaganda. Worried about 
impending environmental legislation, fossil fuel giants invested in 
rebranding their image as environmentally friendly corporations—a 
move aimed at getting them to the table as stakeholders in the green 
economy so they could advance policy agendas favorable to their core 
business (companies like BP and Shell, which operated in much more 
restrictive regulatory regimes in Europe, followed this strategy). Out of 
these greenwashing activities arose now familiar oxymoronic ideas like 
sustainable development, sustainable markets, and sustainable 
capitalism. Groups that promote these schemes include the Business 
Environmental Leadership Council and the World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development—umbrella organizations representing fossil 
fuel businesses. 
While contrarians sought to influence elite and policy maker opinion, 
with the added effect of confusing public opinion through mass media 
channels, the purveyors of greenwashed corporate identities were after 
the policy process itself—their efforts over the past two decades would 
lead to what D. Miller and Dinan (2015, p. 95) call the “corporate 
capture of environmental policy.” 
Another area of research for political economists examining the 
doubt industry focuses on antienvironmental shareholder activism. In 
this case, right-wing contrarians seek to sow doubt among shareholders 
about corporate leaders who are promoting greener practices (read, 
antimarket ideas) within their companies. 
Consider the work of a conservative think tank called the National 
Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR), which issued a 
shareholder resolution to Apple in 2014, demanding information on the 
company’s “associations and memberships and trade associations that 
work on [environmental] sustainability issues,” ostensibly to help other 
shareholders see how Apple had come under the ideological influence 
of anti- market forces. NCPPR lost the vote, but claimed victory for the 
stunt, which they hoped would sow doubt about the credibility of Apple’s 
top managers (Makower, 2014). 
The business press would probably have ignored the event if it were 
not for Apple CEO Tim Cook’s reaction to NCPPR’s market 
fundamentalism. Cook said, “I don’t consider the bloody ROI [return on 
investment]” when designing devices for the blind, environmental 
betterment, or worker safety. “If you want me to do things only for ROI 
reasons,” he said, “you should get out of this stock” (Russell, 2014). 
Shareholder activism has changed over the 70 years since the 
 Securities and Exchange Commission added the Shareholder Proposal 
Rule to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, allowing U.S. 
shareholders (stockholders) to submit proposals to alter company 
operations (Mueller, 1998). For the first 30 years of such activism, 
proposals targeted growth and profits, largely because the Federal 
government did not require companies to inform shareholders, via 
proxy statements, about “social issue” resolutions that were submitted 
to management. 
A legal decision in 1970 changed this, making it possible for 
shareholders to vote on proposals to modify corporate policy in ways 
that could have important social out- comes, like reducing 
environmental harm or expanding workers’ rights. This opened the door 
for individual and institutional investors, foundations, charities, and 
religious and other organizations to file issue-oriented shareholder 
resolutions. Market fundamentalists have been fighting back ever since 
(Goranova & Ryan, 2013). 
Enter the likes of NCPPR, a right-wing think tank created to promote 
ideas on behalf of investors who are “tired of supporting corporations 
that support the left.” A central tenet of the group is that “private owners 
are the best stewards of the environment”— zombie market 
fundamentalists and their cash-operated think tanks love this kind of 
talk.5 While shareholder activism, even more than consumer activism, 
is fundamentally plutocratic—the wealthiest get the most votes, per the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—the strategy of 
contrarian operatives like those at NCPPR is to infect the shareholder 
agenda with antienvironmental discourse using old canards about how 
greening industry will kill jobs, diminish the value of stocks, and shake 
the faith in free markets. 
In detailing the power structure behind the contrarians, the policy 
capture corporations, and shareholder activism, political-economic 
analysis provides a clearer picture of the moneyed interests behind the 
Carbon Barons propaganda campaign to delegitimize climate science 
and the scientific consensus about global warming. Such an analysis 
casts a light on fossil fuel industrialists’ class-conscious aspirations, 
which are boosted by ideological supporters in mainstream media, 
public relations, and publicity-seeking charlatans who revel in thwarting 
both public confidence in climate science and political action to 
intervene in the climate debacle. 
In the absence of a power structure analysis, not only are citizens 
and lawmakers increasingly exposed to media-tolerated contrarian 
claims, boosted by a largely unregulated PR industry, and left with the 
impression that science deniers have a legitimate, independent 
argument worthy of respect. Scientists themselves are bombarded by 
the same nonsense and charlatanism, which can lead them to react in 
 ways that can give merit to contrarians’ claims. Lewandowsky et al. 
(2015) call this “seep- age,” when climate scientists make public 
statements that address or give some slack to refuted arguments of 
contrarians. Seepage happens for a number of reasons: Scientists by 
profession are tempted to counter obvious bullshit and will often take 
the bait when a contrarian idea is dangled before them; they often 
conform to status quo pressures to downplay the severity of global 
warming; their confidence can be rattled by public stereotyping or 
bashing of their profession; and smear tactics like labeling them 
“alarmists,” “arrogant,” or cowards (fearful of debate with science 
deniers). Stereotyping threats can cause them to downplay the facts, 
kowtow to contrarians in counterproductive displays of civility (e.g., 
inviting them to a panel discussion to air “all sides”), or withdraw 
completely from making much needed expert statements in public. And 
when contrarian views are depicted as majority opinion on Fox News 
or in the Wall Street Journal, citizens and scientists alike can react by 
thinking their concerns about global warming are not shared by the 
majority of the population, even the majority of their peers. This mass-
mediated peer pressure can make the staunchest advocate of climate 
science doubt themselves publicly, running the risk of tacitly admitting 
that climate change is controversial6  (Lewandowsky et al., 2015). 
An Example of Fighting Back With Power Structure Analysis: 
Pope Francis’s 2015 Encyclical 
We can synthesize these arguments with a brief look at Pope Francis’s 
highly anticipated environmental encyclical, which was released as we 
were completing this essay. We have argued that there are very 
powerful and well-funded forces working to deny climate science, 
confuse public understanding, and capture environmental policy 
debate. The encyclical, titled “Laudato Si’ (Be Praised), on the Care of 
Our Common Home” (Vatican Press, 2015), offers a compelling counter 
to the antienvironmental status quo, combining political-economic 
analysis with an ecologically centered ethics aspiring to revolutionary 
change of established social, economic, and cultural systems. We will 
focus primarily on the communication and rhetorical strategies within 
the framework of the document’s advocacy for radical action to address 
the ecological crisis.7 
It is ambitious in its scope, addressed to everyone on the planet, not 
just the one billion Catholics who form part of an old, hierarchical 
communication network in which the teachings of papal authority are 
studied, propagated, and amplified by bishops, who meet with priests 
and media to foster ongoing study and lecturing about the document. 
Its far-reaching aims are matched by the aggressive promotional 
strategy of the Vatican, which positioned its release as a major media 
 event “because of the pope’s involvement in a contentious topic” 
(Lyman, 2015). It calls for everyone, everywhere to take action on 
climate change, with the ultimate aim of convincing world leaders at the 
December 2015 U.N. Climate Conference in Paris to make binding and 
enforce- able agreements that would stop the worst human causes of 
global warming and environmental degradation in order to reverse 
impacts, which disproportionately affect people living in the poorest 
regions of the world. 
As we noted above, no claim of scientific consensus about global 
warming possesses the inherent power to beat the weapons of 
misinformation wielded by rich and powerful fossil fuel industrialists and 
their supporters. For that, you need to fight back with power structure 
analysis to raise awareness of the sources of misinformation and their 
class-conscious interests. Pope Francis applies this kind of analysis in 
the encyclical, using one very key rhetorical difference in his 
communication strategy: his ecclesial teaching authority. 
This ecological encyclical employs a number of rhetorical devices 
reserved for papal authority, with corresponding levels of assent built 
into its propagation—the dogma of divine revelation that insists 
Christians are morally responsible for caring for all of creation (“our 
common home” of the subtitle); the definitive (infallible) and 
authoritative (interpretive) doctrines, or canon, that teach adherence to 
dogma (citations of scripture and teachings, notably here, the ecocentric 
teachings of Saint Francis and his followers); and prudential authority, 
the formal instructions used by popes and bishops to implement dogma 
and doctrine (here, his power to offer authoritative conclusions, but also 
his reverence for the judgments of his predecessors on matters of 
environment, environmental justice, labor, and consumerism). 
Prudential judgments are offered to the faithful as sage wisdom to 
consider “openly, thoughtfully, and prayerfully” as “they form their 
consciences” regarding, in this case, the climate crisis (DiLeol, 2015). 
The encyclical focuses on the failure of the contemporary political 
economy and its “technocratic paradigm” to tie technological innovation 
and economic growth to moral and social progress, citing the decline of 
biodiversity, pollution of land, air, and waterways, deforestation, 
desertification, and disappearing beauty of landscapes due to 
overdevelopment and exploitation of natural resources—all of which 
the pope calls sins. The Earth’s atmosphere is defined as a common 
good that gives life to the planet, which means all humans are called on 
to combat the climate crisis any way they can, including fighting the 
human causes. The pope provides example after example of the main 
characteristics of the ecological crisis. 
He targets multinational corporations’ reckless disregard for people 
and environment, and cites research, church teachings, and his own 
 observations to argue that the poorest regions have benefited the least 
from modern industrialism and consumerism but have become the most 
vulnerable to their negative environmental impact. He goes to the heart 
of the political economy, emphasizing the fallibility of the idea of private 
property, in particular when used to benefit only a few. A system that 
socializes harms, while privatizing benefits is vilified. Ecocentric values 
embodied in a culture of sustainability are praised; those of 
hyperconsumerism are pilloried. In the end, it is a proposal for the 
complete transformation of the way we think and act in the world—an 
“integral ecology”—via combinations of education, lifestyle, spirituality, 
politics and policy, and a sensual relation with nonhuman nature, while 
placing labor—especially of marginalized peoples in meaningful forms 
of work—in a vital position to develop the means to end a reliance on 
anthropocentric technocratic answers to the crisis (these include carbon 
credits, criticized by the pope as a ploy to avoid immediate, sweeping 
action).8 
The early attacks on the encyclical recall the tactics of contrarians 
and policy capture strategies discussed earlier. The Wall Street Journal 
disparaged the pope’s “signature theme” of “economic justice and his 
vehement criticism of capitalism,” and “passages of almost apocalyptic 
moralizing.” The Wall Street Journal article included a lay catholic policy 
capturist from the “Acton Institute, a conservative ecumenical think tank 
that advocates for a free market,” to point out the pope’s “significant 
blind spots” about market economics. The article also gave space to 
the chief executive of the World Coal Association who said of the pope’s 
call “to get fossil fuels out of the mix, I don’t think is realistic” (Rocca, 
2015). The New York Times gave space to Richard A. Viguerie, the 
direct mail and survey guru who helped build the political and religious 
right in the United States, who called the pope’s encyclical “a confusing 
distraction [from] crises in the Church and in Western culture” 
(Goodstein, 2015). 
The Heartland Institute had been on hand 2 months before the 
release of the encyclical, protesting an international symposium on 
climate change organized by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences at the 
Vatican. Worried about the conference’s out- come, the director of 
Heartland’s communications said he just wanted to “prevent the pope 
from making the mistake” of paying attention to the “alarmists” 
(Povoledo, 2015). Bishop Sorondo, head of the Pontifical Academy of 
Sciences, was not moved by these charlatans, whom he sees as fronts 
for oil companies and right-wing American interests, including the Tea 
Party. “This is a ridiculous thing, completely,” he said (Yardley, 2015). 
We hope that message prevails. 
 
Conclusion 
 We have traced the theoretical and empirical contributions to conveying 
the reality of climate change from a variety of perspectives. In the face of 
the intensely powerful groups allied against the truth, it is necessary for 
scientists and activists alike (and sometimes they are the same people, 
working in the same organizations) to draw on sophisticated 
psychological, ideological, and political-economic analysis to establish 
their best course of action to initiate change. The urgency of this matter 
cannot be overemphasized. 
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Notes 
1. Our own attempt is a monthly online column for the popular 
magazine Psychology Today, which seeks to translate theoretical 
advances and research findings into palatable fare for the educated 
but nonspecialist reader 
(https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/greening- the-media). We 
draw on some of that work here. 
2. The use of functional magnetic resonance imaging as an 
experimental tool is cutting edge in cognitive neuroscience and its 
application might be useful in designing effective communication 
strategies, though we recommend a strong dose of critical 
neuroscience to go along with this approach (see, e.g., 
http://www.critical-neuroscience.org/). And while a 
liberal/conservative dualism might apply to the United States, it fits 
insecurely to societies where governance and media systems 
tolerate greater political diversity. 
3. See original at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wjh13f00/pdf 
4. See http://www.blueadvertising.com/#/american-petroleum-institute/ 
5. For examples, see http://www.nationalcenter.org/ 
6. This is the lie in our title. 
7. A very clever and amusing spoof was created by a Brazilian group 
as a kind of trailer for the pope’s encyclical 
(http://ecowatch.com/2015/06/12/pope-encyclical-spoof-trailer/). 
8. The document does employ some of the anthropocentric biases of 
proenvironmental communication strategies we outlined above, 
enlisting imagery that resonates with conservatives— filth, toxic 
 landscapes, impure waterways—alongside appeals for 
intergenerational care and human valuation of nature prized by 
liberals. 
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